



The Cost of Violence


A Study of Criminal Cooperation in the Drug Trade

Zora L. Hauser

Postdoctoral Fellow
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford

(with Federico Varese)

The Framework (Federico Varese)




The Framework (Federico Varese)

13 DE OCTUBRE DE 2022
¡CORDIAL SALUDO!

CON ESTA PRESENTE LE INFORMAMOS ALA CUIDADANIA DEL PUEBLO DE TUMACO Y SUS ALREDEDORES. YA ESTAMOS AQUÍ LA. URIAS RENDON PRESENTE ANTE USTEDES Y ES UN HECHO QUE NOS VAMOS A TOMAR ESTE PUEBLO VAMOS A LLEGAR A CADA PUNTO. NEGOCIO, GASOLINERA. PUNTOS DE ACOPIO Y DISTRIBUIDORES DE DROGAS EN SU TOTALIDAD Y A CADA BARRIO VOLADERO, FATIMA, VIENTO LIBRE, BUENOS AIRES, MILENIO, LA PLAYA, SAN FELIPE, EXPORCOL, BAJITO, MORRITO, LOS ANGELES, VICTORIA, CARBONERA, CUIDADELA OBRERO A CADA RIO. MEXICANO, ROSARIO, CHAJAL, BOCAS DE CURAI, CHAGUI SALAHONDA, PATIA, RIO MIRA Y SOMETEREMOS A TODO AQUEL QUE NO SE NOS UNA YA LOS TENEMOS IDENTIFICADOS ASI MISMO ALOS CABECILLAS DE FRENTE DE GUERRA ALIAS ROKY, ALIAS EL MOCHO, ALIAS TIGRE (PINTADO) ALIAS LA YENDY, ALIAS MONSON, ALIAS CARDONA, ALIAS BIRLEY. TODOS USTEDES QUE HACEN PARTE DE ESOS FRENTE YA SABEMOS DE SUS FAMILIARES Y COLABORADORES Y TODO AQUEL QUE ESTA COPERAN...

GOVERNANCE



VS-NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
210

5.1 Gesamtdarstellung der erkannten 'Ndrangheta-Clans in Deutschland

CARABINIERI

CAPI PROMOTORI DELLA COSCA FARAO - MARINCOLA

FARAO Giuseppe cl.47
FARAO Silvio cl.48
MARINCOLA Cataldo cl.61

PRODUCTION


TRADE

volta, ai loro contatti al porto di Gioia Tauro: "...Cugì... Mi pare che dobbiamo organizzare una spedizione tipo Isis..." [...] "...Andiamo a prendere due bombe a mano e le mettiamo a Sinopoli nello svincolo..."

(With Gustavo Duncan)



The Framework (Federico Varese)



Violence in the Drug Trade

- Violence is “omnipresent” within all illegal markets (Hobbs 2013: 177)
 - Cultural, expressive tool, value is in its irrationality (Winlow 2001, Densley 2022)
 - Cycles of violence and revenge in drug markets (McLean and Densley 2022)

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 - Cultural, expressive tool, value is in its irrationality (Winlow 2001, Densley 2022)
 - Cycles of violence and revenge in drug markets (McLean and Densley 2022)
- Incentives to “economise” on the use of violence (Gambetta 1993)
 - Reputation for violence, instrumental value, strategic use (Reuter 1983, Campana and Varese 2013)
 - (Relatively) peaceful contexts/segments of illegal markets (Bouchard, Soudjin and Reuter 2021, Grisaffi 2022)

Research Questions

- 1) Is the drug trade riddled with incidents?
- 2) If so, do incidents give rise to disputes?
- 3) If so, how are disputes solved?



Coordinated crackdown on 'Ndrangheta mafia in Europe

'Operation Pollino': Large-scale coordinated action by judicial and law enforcement authorities in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands



5/12/2018 JOINT ACTION DAY
Simultaneous action by several hundred police, monitored in real time by prosecutors and investigative officers



Almost 4 000 kg of cocaine and considerable amounts of other drugs are seized across Europe in the course of the investigation



Intensive cooperation and joint strategy uncover magnitude and complexity of the criminal activity



2016 A joint investigation team involving the Netherlands, Italy and Germany is set up to coordinate the investigation, with support from Eurojust and extensive data analysis by Europol.

2014 Case referred to Eurojust
Dutch authorities refer the investigation of possible money laundering to Eurojust. The case has clear connections to Italy and Germany.

www.eurojust.europa.eu



Bundeskriminalamt

Staatsanwaltschaft
Duisburg



POLICE
LÛTZEBURG

openbaar
ministerie

Politie



FIOD
Belastingdienst

OPENBAAR MINISTERIE

POLITIE



Federale Politie
Limburg
CSD
FGP

EUROJUST

EUROPOL



84 arrests



House searches



EUR 2 million in assets seized



Seizures: automobiles, real estate, companies, jewelry, electronic equipment, drugs, machine to produce synthetic drugs

Methods/Data

- Italian indictment of Op Pollino (2018, events between 2015-2018)
- Dataset on transactions (exchanges of illegal narcotic between two parties) N=81
- Dataset on actors (involved in transactions) N=91
- Coding scheme (quantity, value, type of drug, date and place of birth, affiliation, etc.)
 - Incidents, Disputes, (threat of) Violence
- Descriptive statistics + qualitative analysis

Transactions

- Cocaine: 67% of transactions, 82% of quantity; 98% of value (also Cannabis, Synthetic Drugs)

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
Geographical Span

- 30% (N=24) Extra-European (e.g., Belgium – Colombia)
- 16% (N=13) Within Europe (e.g., Germany – Italy)
- 17% (N=14) Within Italy (e.g., Calabria – Lombardy)
- 14% (N=11) Within Calabria

Simplified Exchange Structure – European Side



Groups from:
Ecuador
Colombia
Peru
Argentina



Results (1) Use of Violence

- Incidents and disputes are common in the drug trade
- However, the use of violence is not “omnipresent”
- Many incidents never developed into a dispute
- No dispute was solved with violence
- Several disputes were never resolved at all

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Incidents: 46% (N=37)

- Half of the incidents developed into a dispute (51%, N=19)
- Violence rarely threatened (N=7) and NEVER used

Results (2) Geography of Violence

Extra-European transactions are the most numerous (30%, N=24), account for most incidents (32%, N=12) and disputes (37%, N=7)

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Transactions within Calabria are the least numerous (14%, N=11) give rise to less incidents (19%, N=7) and disputes (21%, N=4)

- Every dispute involved the threat of violence (57%, N=4)

Why no Violence in Trade?

GOVERNANCE: groups that seek to establish authority over a territory, regulate interactions and exchanges (Campana and Varese 2018; Shortland and Varese 2016)

→ Violence key ingredient, can be deployed locally (zero-sum game)

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TRADE: “action sets”, short- or long-term patterns of cooperation (Morselli and Roy 2008, Zhang and Chin 2003, Paoli 2004)

→ Violence can be counterproductive, more costly (positive-sum game)

Why no Violence in Long Distance Trade?

- **FEASIBILITY:** Long distances increase the cost of violence to the point that its use becomes impractical
- **LACK OF CREDIBILITY:** The costlier the threat, the less credible is its execution
- **UNCERTAINTY:** Long distances increase the cost of monitoring to the point that establishing culpability is either (1) impossible, or results (2) in a lengthy process

How is Cooperation Sustained?

TRUST SUBSTITUTION MECHANISMS

- Financial incentives
- Insurance/Hostage exchange
- Repeated interaction
- Proof
- “Good will” (sometimes just an apology)

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STALEMATE in **trade** is the least favourable option for both parties. Even the worst outcome is considered preferable to stalemate (Shelling 1956: 292).

Caveat

It does not follow that violence is NEVER used.

- Specific case/Data limitation

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Under what conditions is the use of violence conducive to/necessary for cooperation?

→ Cooperation, Surplus Sharing and Punishment in Criminal Settings (work in progress, with Alae Baha and Federico Varese).



Thank you!

Zora L. Hauser

Postdoctoral Fellow
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zora.hauser@sociology.ox.ac.uk